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Abstract 
Investments in the human capital of children during their upbringing determine the opportunities 
available in adulthood. Recognizing that the parent-child interaction plays a significant role in the 
accumulation of child human capital, we develop a differential game in which the parent may invest 
directly in child human capital and the child consumes goods that influence the accumulation of their 
human capital. We compare the accumulation of child human capital between three different 
parenting styles, formalized as three different solution concepts to the differential game: (i) the parent 
and the child maximizes a joint utility function (cooperative solution), (ii) the parent announces a 
strategy dependent on time only (open-loop Stackelberg), (iii) the parent’s strategy depends on the 
accrued amount of human capital (feedback Stackelberg). We show that under rather general 
assumptions the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is time consistent, and coincides with a feedback 
Stackelberg equilibrium. Using cooperative parenting as a benchmark, we find that less or more child 
human capital may be accumulated over the family’s planning horizon under “open-loop Stackelberg” 
parenting, depending on parental and child preferences for human capital and wealth at the terminal 
time of the family’s planning horizon, and on the extent to which child consumption influences the 
accumulation of their human capital. In particular, if the child’s preference for terminal time wealth is 
strong enough, more human capital will be accumulated under “open-loop Stackelberg” parenting. 
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Introduction 
The two most important components of human capital are education and health. Child and 
adolescent (hereafter child) human capital is important largely because it affects that person’s future 
prospects for health, education, labour-market, and other essential lifetime outcomes. Ample evidence 
from both the epidemiological and economic literature supports this statement, see, e.g., Campbell et 
al. (2014), Currie (2009) and Currie and Almond (2011). Investments in child human capital are made 
both through public efforts, e.g., vaccination programs and compulsory schooling, and intra-family 
allocation of time and resources. Public and private investments may be offset or reinforced by 
activities and consumption choices made by children. For instance, alcohol consumption at an early 
age, illegal drug abuse, and risky sexual behaviour adversely affect the formation of human capital 
either directly, through physiological mechanisms, or indirectly, by rendering the production of 
human capital less effective. Other activities and consumption choices may have the opposite effect, 
examples of which include following stipulated educational curricula and a wholesome diet, exerting 
appropriate amounts of physical activities, and taking part in non-trivial cultural activities.   
 
Several intra-family decision-making mechanisms have been proposed in the literature, and typically 
involve cooperative or strategic interaction between the family members. In a dynamic context, the 
mechanisms suggested in the literature may be further classified as to whether or not future 
allocations are made contingent on accruing key outcomes.  The interaction between parents and their 
children is typically characterised by asymmetries regarding, for instance, financial resources and 
farsightedness, and by parents being the main holders of the decision-making initiative. In the 
literature on the economics of parenting styles, as in Doepke and Zilibotti (2017), no clear distinction 
is made between decision-making mechanisms per se and the ultimate objectives that parents and 
their children strive to attain. A parent is typically assumed to be both altruistic and paternalistic, and 
unless purely altruistic, there is a conflict between child and parental preferences. This conflict is 
recognised and the different parenting styles considered are simply different ways to achieve its 
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resolution. We adopt a different set of definitions of parenting styles by departing from the typical 
decision-making mechanism used to allocate resources. Thus, our main objective is to examine the 
importance of different intra-family decision-making mechanisms for the accumulation of child 
human capital.  To this end, we formulate a differential game that accounts for the parent-child 
interaction and apply three different solution concepts to it, reflecting three different “parenting 
styles”.  
 
One of the pioneers in the development of economic theories of family decision-making and human 
capital was Gary Becker (1981, 1993). The focus of his analyses was on gains to family formation 
assuming cooperation on the part of the family members. Even though there may be strong 
incentives for honouring cooperatively made decisions about intra-family conduct, few, if any, 
domestic actions can be controlled by enforceable agreements. Consequently, incentives for strategic 
behaviour, generally entailing allocations that differ from cooperatively made Pareto efficient 
allocations, cannot be perfectly curbed. Thus, several authors argue that strategic behaviour needs to 
be taken into account when analysing intra-family decision making—see, for instance, King (1982), 
Konrad and Lommerud (1995), Dufwenberg (2002), and Oosterbeek et al., (2003). The survey of 
economic theories of the family by Bergström (1997) focused on consensus models of the family, and 
strategic considerations were only briefly discussed. No doubt, this owes to the fact that, at the time, 
non-cooperative game theory was largely unexplored as a means of studying the family. More recent 
contributions to this field include parent-child interaction, as in Chang (2009) and Chang et al. (2005), 
but from the perspectives of children competing for parental resources.  
 
A family is exposed to strategic behaviour, but parental decisions regarding investments in the human 
capital of young children may be less so, as (a) young children make no intentional investments on 
their own and, hence, cannot strategically offset parental investment by lowering their own, and (b) 
parents of young children are able to monitor and enforce good habits—at least to some degree. On 
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the other hand, when children reach the age when some autonomy is an essential part of eventually 
becoming an independent adult, but still are dependent on the family for survival, they will be able to 
behave strategically in relation to the "freedom" offered by parents.  
 
Given that children can only be governed imperfectly, parents must decide how resources are 
allocated given strategic, selfish and relatively short-sighted child behaviour. This is reminiscent of 
Becker’s famous Rotten-kid theorem, which implies that a selfish child will cooperate in maximising 
family welfare if financial incentives are properly tuned. Thus, a parent who faces a related, but more 
complex, situation of making optimal investments in child human capital during the child’s upbringing 
may design financial incentives not only as a means of fulfilling altruistic objectives, but also as a tool 
for influencing child behaviour.  
 
The differential game contemplated refines some specific aspects of the multifaceted parent-child 
relationship. General properties of the game are first established. Employing some simplifying 
assumptions it is then explicitly solved using three different solution concepts, each of which 
illustrates a different parenting style. Much of the focus is on the amount of child human capital at the 
end of the planning horizon. By employing the aforementioned assumptions, the said game belongs 
to the class of differential games referred to as “tractable games” by Dockner et al. (2000), their 
defining property being explicit solvability. Dockner et al. (2000) argued that “analytical tractability is 
stressed, since analytical solutions have the advantage of shedding light on the qualitative properties 
of equilibria in a general way”. Tractable differential games have been applied to various areas in 
economics, such as drugs, corruption and terrorism, the environment and natural resources, industrial 
organisation and political economy—see, for instance, Dockner et al. (2000), Grass et al. (2008), Hori 
and Shibata (2010), Long (2010, 2011), and Novak et al. (2010). The theoretical modelling of dynamic 
and strategic interactions within the family has even been investigated by mathematicians and 
biologists, as in Ewald et al. (2007). 
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A differential-game approach to investments in child human capital 
The core features of the model involve one parent who has a first-mover advantage in the allocation 
of wealth between investment in child human capital and their own consumption. Given the parent’s 
allocation and a lifetime budget constraint, the child chooses how much to consume of each of two 
goods, of which one has a detrimental effect on human capital while the other has a beneficial effect. 
It is assumed that the child is old enough to make autonomous decisions regarding how to allocate 
the available resources between the two types of consumptions. 
 
We derive solutions under three different informational structures governing the parent’s and child’s 
decision making. The first structure assumes that the parent and child make decisions hierarchically 
under open-loop information, referred to as the non-evaluating parenting style, thereby yielding an open-
loop Stackelberg equilibrium. This means that the leader, i.e., parent, announces their strategy for the 
entire planning period at the initial time and thus posses a first-mover advantage in this sense, which 
is fully committed and conditioned only on the clock and exogenous variables. The second assumes 
that the parent and child make decisions cooperatively under open-loop information, referred to as 
the cooperative parenting style, thus resulting in a cooperative equilibrium. The cooperative case reflects 
the situation in which the parent has implemented joint, as opposed to strategic, decision making. 
And the third assumes that the parent and child make decisions hierarchically under feedback 
information, referred to as the evaluating parenting style, hence yielding a feedback Stackelberg 
equilibrium. This is a situation in which a parent allocates resources contingent on time, the accrued 
stock of human capital, wealth and exogenous variables, and in which they posses a first-mover 
advantage at each point in time. 
 
General structure 
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The formal structure of the model is as follows. At each point in time,  0,T  , the parent derives 
utility from investments, ( ) 0I   , in child human capital, ( ) 0H   , and their own consumption, 
( ) 0Q   , and the child derives utility from two types of consumption, 1( ) 0Q    and 2( ) 0Q   . 
Consumption of 1Q  adds to the change in the child’s stock of human capital over time, while 
consumption of 2Q  subtracts from it. The human-capital state equation is 
 1 2( ) ( ( ), ( ), ( )) ( )H f I Q Q H       , 0(0)H H ,  (1) 
where ( )f   is a human-capital production function such that (2)( )f C  , with partial derivatives 
0If  , 1 0Qf  , and 2 0Qf  , and 0H  is the initial stock of child human capital.   
 
The following additional assumptions are then adopted:  
(A1) Parental ( p ) and child ( c ) preferences are represented by the utility functions 
 (2)( ( ), ( ))pU Q I C   , (2) 
 (2)1 2( ( ), ( ))
cU Q Q C   , (3) 
 where 0ijU  , , ; 1,2i p c j  . 
(A2)  Parental preferences for the stocks of human capital and financial assets at T  , are 
represented by the utility function ( ) ( )H AH T A T  , where 0H   and 0A  . 
(A3) Child preferences for the stocks of human capital and financial assets at T  , are 
represented by the utility function ( ) ( )H AH T A T  , where 0H   and 0A  .  
(A4) There are perfect financial markets, which allow lending and borrowing at the 
continuously compounded interest rate 0r  .  
(A5) Under each solution concept there exists a unique optimal control vector, such that all 
control variables are strictly positive for [0, )T  . 
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Assumption (A1) places prototypical restrictions on the instantaneous utility functions, that is, (i) they 
are twice continuously differentiable and (ii) ,Q I and 1 2,Q Q are goods. The formulation of the scrap-
value functions in stipulations (A2) and (A3) permits the derivation of explicit solutions to the 
differential game. Assumption (A4) is a standard assumption. It means that financial resources can be 
transferred between time periods and thus that a lifetime budget constraint applies, as may be seen in 
what follows. On the other hand, in the absence of financial markets, borrowing and lending is not 
possible, in which case a different budget constraint would bind at each point in time. 
 
Budget constraint 
Given perfect financial markets, the budget constraint faced by both agents asserts that the present 
value of expenses must be less than or equal to the present value of available resources. More 
formally, the budget constraint is 
  1 2 0
0 0
T T
- r rI( ) Q( ) Q ( ) Q ( ) e d A ye d            , (4) 
where 0 0A   is the initial stock of assets, and 0y   is a fixed flow of income. By defining 
  def ( )0 1 2
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) er r tA A e y I t Q t Q t Q t dt

         , (5) 
and then using Leibniz’s rule and the lifetime budget constraint, it follows that 
 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )A rA y I Q Q Q           , 0(0)A A , ( ) 0A T  . (6) 
 
The optimal control problems 
In the non-evaluating (open-loop) and evaluating (feedback) cases, the parent and the child act as if 
solving certain optimal control problems. Letting 0p    be the parental rate of time preference, the 
parent acts as if solving  
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  def0 0
( ), ( )
0
( , ) max ( ), ( )  [ ( ) ( )]p p
T
Tp p
H A
Q I
V A H U Q I e d H T A T e
  
    
 
 
   , (7) 
under different informational structures, and subject to the state equation (1), the budget constraint 
(6), and the non-negativity constraints on the control variables. Similarly, letting c be the child rate 
of time preferences, the child acts as if solving 
  
1 2
def
0 0 1 2
( ), ( )
0
( , ) max ( ), ( ) [ ( ) ( )]c c
T
Tc c
H A
Q Q
V A H U Q Q e d H T A T e
       
 
   , (8) 
subject to the state equation (1), the budget constraint (6), and the said non-negativity constraints. 
 
In the cooperative case, the parent and the child behave as if solving  
 
 
1 2
1 2def
00 0
( ), ( ) ( ), ( )
( ( ), ( )) ( ( ), ( ))
( , ) max ,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
T
p c
I Q Q Q
T
H A H A
U Q I U Q Q e d
V A H
H T A T H T A T e


    
   

   

 
     
     

 (9) 
subject to the aforementioned equations. 
 
In the subsequent sections we, first, demonstrate that (i) the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is 
time consistent, (ii) an open-loop Nash equilibrium is a degenerate feedback Nash equilibrium, (iii) an 
open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is identical to an open-loop Nash equilibrium, and (iv) a feedback 
Stackeberg equilibrium is identical to a feedback Nash equilibrium, and, second, derive an optimal 
control vector for each parenting style. Function arguments are omitted where appropriate.  
 
General properties of noncooperative equilibria 
Following Dockner et al. (2000) or Grass et al. (2008), an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is 
defined as follows: (a) the parent makes a binding commitment, at 𝜏 = 0, to investment and 
consumption time paths, 𝐼(𝜏) and 𝑄(𝜏), (b) given 𝐼(𝜏) and 𝑄(𝜏), the child chooses consumption 
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time paths, 1( )Q  and 2( )Q   according to (8), and (c) the parent chooses investments in child human 
capital and consumption according to (7), using the child’s reaction functions.  
 
An open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is not in general time consistent, as shown by Xie (1997) and 
Dockner et al. (2000). However, the aforesaid authors demonstrated that if the initial values of the 
follower’s costate variables are not controllable by the leader, then an open-loop Stackelberg 
equilibrium is time consistent. We now demonstrate that this is the case in the model outlined above.  
 
To that end, define the child’s, i.e., the follower’s, current-value Hamiltonian function by 
   1 2 1 2
e
1 2
d f
1 2( , , , , , ) ( , ) [ ( , ], ) ] [
c c c c c c
A H H A rA yA H Q Q U Q Q f I Q Q H I Q Q Q           . (10) 
where cA  and 
c
H  are the child’s costate variables corresponding to the state equations for assets and 
human capital, respectively. Given assumption (A5), the maximum principle gives the following 
necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality:  
 
1 11 2 1 2
( , ) ( , , ) 0c c cQ H Q AU Q Q f I Q Q    , 
 
2 21 2 1 2
( , ) ( , , ) 0c c cQ H Q AU Q Q f I Q Q    , 
  [ ]
c c
H c H     , ( )
c
H HT  , 
 [ ]
c c
A c Ar    , ( )
c
A AT  . (11) 
By the implicit function theorem the follower’s reaction functions, say 11 ( , , )
c c
A HQ R I    and 
2
2 ( , , )
c c
A HQ R I   , exist and are locally 
(1)C . 
 
Observe that the two costate equations are wholly independent of the parent’s control variables, and 
thus so are the initial values of said costate variables, thereby establishing the ensuing proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: The open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium in the parenting game described by Eqs. (7) 
and (8) is time consistent.  
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The preceding means that the announced consumption and investment strategies are indeed credible 
in the eyes of the child. Next, observe that (i) the instantaneous utility functions of the parent and the 
child are independent of the state variables ( , )A H , (ii) the state equations (1) and (6) are linear in 
( , )A H , and (iii) the salvage value functions are linear in ( , )A H . Consequently, the differential game 
under consideration meets the definition of a linear state game by Dockner et al. (2000, p. 188). As 
discussed by Dockner et al. (2000, p. 189), the following proposition is an immediate consequence of 
this fact. 
 
Proposition 2: If an open-loop Nash equilibrium exists in the differential game defined by Eqs. (1), 
(6), (7) and (8), then it is a degenerate feedback Nash equilibrium and, hence, subgame perfect. 
 
Define the parent’s, i.e., the leader’s, current value Hamiltonian function by 
  
 def 1 2
1 2
( , , , , , , , , ( , ( ,
( , ( ,
[ ,]
) ( , ) , ), , )
, ) , )
+ [ ]cc
p p p p p p p c c c c
A H A H H A H A H
p c c c c
A A H A H
p p c
H A c AH
A H Q I U Q Rf I I R I H
rA y I Q
r
R I
I
R I
        
    
   

  
  


  
    

  

 (12) 
where pA  and 
p
H  are the parent’s costate variables corresponding to the state equations for assets 
and human capital, respectively, and pA  and 
p
H  are the parent’s costate variables corresponding to 
the costate equations of the child for assets and human capital.  Given assumption (A5), the necessary 
and sufficient conditions are 
 
 
 
 
1
2
1 2
1 2 1
1 2 2
1 2
( , ) , ( , , ), ( , , )
, ( , , ), ( , , ) ( , , )
, ( , , ), ( , , ) ( , , )
1 ( , , ) ( , , ) 0,
p p c c c c
I H I A H A H
c c c c c c
Q A H A H I A H
c c c c c c
Q A H A H I A H
p c c c c
A I A H I A H
U I Q f I R I R I
f I R I R I R I
f I R I R I R I
R I R I
    
     
     
    
 

 
      
 
 ( , ) 0
p p
Q AU I Q   , 
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 [ ]
p p
H p H     , ( )
p
H HT  , 
 [ ]
p p
A p Ar    , ( )
p
A AT  , 
 
 
 
1
2
1 2 1
1 2 2
1 2
[ ]
, ( , , ), ( , , ) ( , , )
, ( , , ), ( , , ) ( , , )
( , , ) ( , , ) ,
c
H
c
H
c c
H H
p p
H p c H
c c c c c c
Q A H A H A H
c c c c c c p
Q A H A H A H H
c c c c p
A H A H A
f I R I R I R I
f I R I R I R I
R I R I


 
    
     
      
    
  




  
 
 
 
 
 
1
2
1 2 1
1 2 2
1 2
[ ]
, ( , , ), ( , , ) ( , , )
, ( , , ), ( , , ) ( , , )
( , , ) ( , , ) .
c
A
c
A
c c
A A
p p
A p c A
c c c c c c
Q A H A H A H
c c c c c c p
Q A H A H A H H
c c c c p
A H A H A
r
f I R I R I R I
f I R I R I R I
R I R I


 
   
     
      
    
  




  
 
  
    
(13) 
 
Now assume that ( )f   is jointly linear in all its arguments. This assumption implies the follower’s 
reaction functions, and that the necessary and sufficient conditions determining the leader’s open-
loop Stackelberg equilibrium are identical to the necessary and sufficient conditions that determine an 
open-loop Nash equilibrium, thereby establishing the next proposition.  
 
Proposition 3: If ( )f   is jointly linear in all its arguments, then an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium 
coincides with an open-loop Nash equilibrium. 
 
The linearity of ( )f   therefore implies that the leadership by a parent has no effect on the equilibrium 
of the game given open-loop information. This section is brought to a close by deducing one more 
general result. First, observe that ( , )pQU Q I  and ( , )
p
IU Q I  are independent of 1 2( , )Q Q , and that 
1 1 2
( , )cQU Q Q  and 2 1 2( , )
p
QU Q Q  are independent of ( , )Q I . Second, note that the two state equations 
are linear functions of the four control variables 1 2( , , , )Q I Q Q . It therefore follows from Definition 
2.4 of Rubio (2006) that the reaction functions of the differential game are orthogonal, assuming that 
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that the information structure is of the feedback variety. The veracity of the ensuing proposition then 
follows immediately from footnote 3 and Proposition 2.3 of Rubio (2006). 
 
Proposition 4: If ( )f   is jointly linear in all its arguments and the information structure of the game 
defined by Eqs. (1), (6), (7), and (8) is of the feedback variety, then a feedback Stackelberg equilibrium 
coincides with a feedback Nash equilibrium.  
 
Taken together, Proposition 3 and 4 show that the first-mover advantage of a parent vanishes when 
( )f   is linear, whether the information structure is open-loop or feedback. In what follows, we 
maintain the assumption that ( )f   is jointly linear in all its arguments. 
 
Next, we derive explicit solutions associated with the three different parenting styles. To that end, we 
begin by placing additional stipulations on the differential game.  
 
Additional assumptions regarding the model specification  
The following additional assumptions are made: 
(A1’) Parental and child preferences are represented by quadratic instantaneous utility 
 functions  
 
2 21 1
2 2
( ( ), ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )pU Q I Q Q I I         , (14) 
 
2 21 1
1 2 1 1 2 22 2
( ( ), ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )cU Q Q Q Q Q Q            , (15) 
 where  q ³ 0  is a parameter reflecting the child’s relative preferences for the two 
consumption goods. 
(A5’) The optimal control vector, under each solution concept, is strictly positive, i.e., all 
control variables are strictly positive for [0, )T  . 
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(A6) Consumption of 1Q  adds 1 1Q  1( 0)   to, while consumption of 2Q  deducts 2 2Q
 2( 0)   from, the stock of human capital. 
(A7) The stock of human capital does not depreciate during the part of the child’s lifecycle 
considered here.  
(A8) The rate of time discounting is zero.  
 
Assumptions (A1’) and (A6) are made in order to derive closed-form solutions, whereas assumption 
(A7) is made for convenience. By assumption (A5’) complications involving boundary solutions are 
avoided. Due to the linearity of ( )f   and assumptions (A1’) and (A6), the Mangasarian sufficiency 
theorem can be invoked and, hence, the optimal control vector is unique. A more general 
specification, allowing for proportional deterioration of the stock of human capital, would not 
influence the qualitative content of our results. Likewise, assumption (A8) does not qualitatively 
influence the equilibria either, as it merely introduces a scaling of the equilibrium amount of child 
human capital at  compared to the case with a strictly positive rate of time discounting. 
 
Given the linearity of ( )f   and assumption (A6), the human-capital state equation becomes 
  1 1 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )H I Q Q        . (16) 
We start by considering the cooperative family, in which case the allocation derived is by construction 
Pareto efficient. This solution serves as a benchmark for the two non-cooperative solutions 
considered.  
 
Cooperative parenting  
The parent and the child act as if solving optimization problem (9), subject to Eqs. (6) and (16). The 
Hamiltonian function is: 
T 
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 
   
def 2 2 2 21 1 1 1
1 2 1 1 2 22 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 2
( , , , , , , , )
,
A H
H A
A H Q I Q Q Q Q I I Q Q Q Q
I Q Q rA y Q I Q Q
  
   
        
        
 (17) 
where A  and H  are the costate variables corresponding to the asset and human capital state 
equations, respectively. The necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for a strictly positive 
control vector are: 
 1 0AQ    ,  
 1 0H AI      , 
 1 1(1 ) 0H AQ       , 
 2 21 0H AQ       , 
 0H  , ( )H H HT    , 
 A Ar  , ( )A A AT    . (18) 
Seeing as ( ) 0H H H       and 
( )( ) ( ) 0r TA A A e
       , it follows that the cooperative 
equilibrium is given by 
 * ( )( ) 1 ( ) ( ) r TH H A AI e
          , 
 * ( )( ) 1 ( ) r TA AQ e
      , 
 * 1 1 ( )1 1( ) 1 ( ) ( )
r T
H H A AQ e
              , 
 * ( )2 2( ) 1 ( ) ( )
r T
H H A AQ e
           . (19) 
 
Child human-capital investment, and the consumption of all three goods, are increasing over time at a 
rate proportional to the joint preference for the terminal stock of financial assets, A A  . This is so 
since the shadow price of wealth decreases over time and, hence, reduces the marginal cost of 
investment and the consumption goods. The magnitude of each control variable at each point in time 
relative to unity—the satiation rate of investment and consumption—is partly determined by the 
same preferences. For example, human-capital investment is below 1 for all  0,T   if joint 
preferences for the terminal stock of financial assets are stronger than joint preferences for the 
terminal stock of human capital, i.e., if ( ) ( ) 0H H A A       . A similar observation can be made 
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for *
1 ( )Q  . In contrast, parental consumption and child consumption of the good that is harmful to 
human capital are always less than the satiation rate.  
 
The terminal value of child human capital is endogenous, and so must be found by solving the state 
equation for human capital using the cooperative equilibrium. Its derivation is given in the appendix 
and yields the proof of the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 5: Given Eq. (19) and the human-capital state equation, the optimal amount of child human capital at 
T   in the cooperative family is given by: 
  1 1 1 2 20 1 2 1 2 1 2( ) ( ) 1 1 1 ( 1)( )rTA A H HH T H r e T                             . (20) 
 
A few observations about the optimal amount of child human capital for the cooperative equilibrium 
at the end of the planning horizon are in order. First, note that the strength of the parent’s and the 
child’s preferences for the child’s human capital at T   is positively related to the size of the human 
capital stock at that time. This is so because the stronger those preferences are, more is invested and 
spent on the good with a beneficial effect on human capital, and less is spent on the good with a 
detrimental effect. Second, the parent’s and the child’s preferences for the stock of financial wealth at 
T   might be positively or negatively related to the stock of human capital at the end of the 
planning horizon. The reason is that the stronger the parent’s or child’s preferences for terminal 
wealth the less is spent on all goods that influence the stock, and that the beneficial effect of reducing 
2Q  may or may not outweigh the negative effect of reducing I  and 1Q . Third, the extent to which 
the detrimental effect that good two has on the child’s stock of human capital 2( ) at the end of the 
planning horizon is given by 
  
*
1
2
2
( )
( )( 1) 2 ( ) 1 0rTA A H H
H T
r e T    

       

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if 22 ( ) 1H H    . The intuition behind this somewhat counterintuitive result is that the effect on 
the stock of an increase in 
2 works through 2Q  only, and that the positive indirect effect, 
*
2 2 2Q    , outweighs the negative direct effect, 
*
2Q .  
 
The non-evaluating parenting style  
By Proposition 3, the equilibrium resulting from the non-evaluating parenting style is derived by 
computing the open-loop Nash equilibrium of the game. Thus, the Hamiltonian functions associated 
with the child’s and the parent’s optimization problems are 
 
 
 
def 2 21 1
1 1 2 22 2
1 2
1 2 1 1 2 2( , , , , , )
c c c c
A H H
c
A
Q Q Q IQ
rA Q
A H Q Q Q Q
y I Q Q
    

       
    

 (21) 
 
 
 
def 2 2
21 2 1 1 2 2
1
1
1
2
2
( , , , , , , , , , )
.
p p p p p p
A H A H H
p
A
Q Q I IA H Q I Q Q I Q Q
QrA y Q QI
      

     
 

 


 (22) 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality for a strictly positive child control vector are 
  1 11 0
c c
H AQ       ,  
 2 21 0
c c
H AQ       ,  
 0
c
H  , ( )
c
H HT  , 
 , ( )
c
A AT  , (23) 
And those for the parent are 
 *1 0p pA HI      , 
 *1 0pAQ    , 
 0
p
H  , ( )
p
H HT  , 
 
p p
A Ar   , ( )
p
A AT  .  (24) 
 
Seeing as [ ]( )c r TA Ae
    , ( )cH H   , 
[ ]( )p r TA Ae
     , and ( )pH H   , the time-consistent 
open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium, i.e., the equilibrium allocation in the non-evaluating family is  
 ( )( ) 1S r TH AI e
      , 
 ( )( ) 1S r TAQ e
    , 
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 1 1 ( )1 1( ) 1
S r T
H AQ e
          , 
 ( )2 2( ) 1
S r T
H AQ e
       . (25) 
 
As was the case in the cooperative family, investment and all consumption increase over time in the 
non-evaluating family. In the present case, however, the rate of increase is proportional to each 
agent’s marginal valuation of the terminal stock of financial assets, rather than to the family’s marginal 
valuation of the terminal stock, implying that the rate of increase is smaller in the non-evaluating 
family than in the cooperative family. Deductions concerning the position of each control trajectory 
in relation to unity are analogous to those made in the cooperative case, with the difference that in 
this case the relative strength of each agent’s preferences for the terminal stocks determines the 
position of each trajectory. So, for instance, if A H  , then 
*( ) 1I    for all  0,T  .    
 
Again, the stock of child human capital at T  in the non-evaluating family is obtained by solving 
the human-capital state equation (16) using the above open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium. The result is 
given in proposition 6 and proven in the appendix. 
 
Proposition 6: Given Eq. (25) and the human-capital state equation, the equilibrium amount of child human 
capital at T  in the non-evaluating family is given by: 
 
1 1 1
0 2 1 1 1 2 2( ) ( ) ( 1) 1 (1 ) (1 )
S rT
A A H H HH T H r e T            
                   . 
(26) 
 
The following observations are noteworthy. First, the more the parent prefers child human capital at 
time T  , the larger is the stock of it at that time. This is so, since as H  increases, more is invested 
in child human capital during the family’s lifetime. The opposite is true regarding the strength of the 
parent’s preferences for terminal wealth ( )A T . Second, as was the case in the cooperative family, the 
child’s preferences for ( )A T  might be positively or negatively related to ( )SH T , as they are 
negatively linked to *1Q  and 
*
2Q . If, however, 
1
2 1  
 , then ( ) 0S AH T    . Third, the strength 
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of the child’s preferences for ( )H T  is positively related to ( )SH T , since H is positively related to 
1 ( )
SQ   and negatively related to 2 ( )
SQ  . And fourth, the effect of an increase in j2  on the child’s 
terminal human capital is given by  12 2( ) ( 1) (2 1)
S rT
A HH T r e T   
      , which may be 
positive or negative, depending on the magnitude of 
A  and H . But if 22 1H   , then an increase 
in the marginal damage to human capital as a result of the child’s consumption of good two leads to a 
larger terminal stock of human capital. 
 
The accumulation of child human capital differs between the two preceding parenting styles according 
to the following proposition, as may be seen by comparing Eqs. (20) and (26). 
 
Proposition 7: The difference *( ) ( )SH T H T  is given by 
 
1 1 1 2 2
2 1 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( )
S rT
A A H HH T H T r e T         
                     . (27) 
 
The amount of child human capital accumulated at the end of the family’s lifetime may be larger or 
smaller under cooperative parenting compared to non-evaluating parenting, depending on the 
preferences of the parent and the child, and the magnitude of the effects of the child’s consumption 
on the evolution of their capital stock. For example, the larger is the magnitude of the detrimental 
human-capital effect of 2Q , the larger is the difference
*( ) ( )SH T H T . So, cooperative parenting 
will lead to more child human capital than non-evaluating parenting when 2  is (sufficiently) large. 
The one situation in which the non-evaluating parenting style leads to more child human capital than 
the cooperative parenting style involves sufficiently strong child preferences for the stock of financial 
assets at T  , which, in the cooperative case, will be incorporated directly in the family’s decision 
making, and thereby leads to smaller investments in human capital. 
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The evaluating parenting style  
In this section, we assume that the parent posses a first-mover advantage and has adopted a feedback 
strategy. This means that the parent’s decisions about investment and consumption at each point in 
time are made based upon the accrued values of the stocks of financial assets and human capital. As 
demonstrated by Dockner et al. (2000), the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium can be derived using 
dynamic programming. More specifically, in our case we derive an explicit solution by conjecturing 
specific functional forms of the value functions of the parent and the child and, then, by employing 
the method of undetermined coefficients to the two Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations. 
Recall that the feedback Stackelberg and the Nash equilibria coincide, by Proposition 4. We thus 
derive the feedback Nash equilibrium.  
 
By Theorem 3.1 of Dockner et al. (2000) the HJB equation corresponding to the parent’s 
optimization problem (7) is given by 
    2 21 1 1 1 2 2 1 22 2
,
( , , ) maxp p pH A
I Q
V A H I I Q Q V I Q Q V rA y Q I Q Q                 , (28) 
with terminal condition ( , ( ), ( )) ( ) ( )p A HV T A T H T A T a H T  . Similarly, the HJB equation 
corresponding to the child’s problem (8) is given by 
 
 
 1 2
2 21 1
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 22 2
,
1 2
( , , ) max
c
Hc
cQ Q
A
Q Q Q Q V I Q Q
V A H
V rA y Q I Q Q

  

            
       
, (29) 
 
with terminal condition ( , ( ), ( )) ( ) ( )c A HV T A T H T A T H T   .  
 
Given the functional forms in the two optimization problems, reasonable conjectures about the 
parent’s and child’s value function are   
 ( , , ) ( ) ( ) ( )pV A H a H b A c      . (30) 
 ( , , ) ( ) ( ) ( )cV A H d H e A f      , (31) 
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In order for the conjectured value functions to satisfy the corresponding HJB equations, the time 
dependent coefficients must be determined so that the value functions satisfy the corresponding HJB 
equations (28) and (29), for all (feasible) values of ( , , )A H . This amounts to (i) maximizing the 
right-hand sides of the HJB equations with respect to the control variables and solving for the control 
variables, (ii) substituting the solutions from (i) back into to each HJB equation, (iii) substituting the 
partial derivatives of the conjectured value functions in Eqs. (30) and (31) in the HJB equations, and 
(iv) equating the coefficients on ( , ,1)A H  on the right- and left-hand sides of the HJB equations. This 
procedure leads to a six-equation system of ordinary differential equations, the solution to which is 
given in the following proposition—the proof is outlined in the appendix. 
 
Proposition 8: Let 
*
 denote a solution to a differential equation for a coefficient in Eqs. (30) and (31). Then, given 
the functional forms in Eqs. (14)–(16), Eqs. (30) and (31) are value functions for the corresponding optimal control 
problems (7) and (8), if 
 * * ( )[ ( ), ( )] [ , ]r TH Aa b e
     , (32) 
 * * ( )[ ( ), ( )] [ , ]r TH Ad e e
     , (33) 
where *( )c   and *( )f   satisfy the differential equations ( , )c h t  x and ( , )f g t  x , where x is the vector 
of parameters (see the appendix). 
 
The evaluating family equilibrium amount of child human-capital investment and consumption may 
then be obtained by using the conjectured value functions and (32) and (33). These calculations are 
outlined in the appendix, and the result is summarized in the following corollary. 
 
Corollary 1: The feedback Stackelberg equilibrium resulting from the value functions derived in Proposition 8, is 
identical to the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium in Eq. (25). 
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Corollary 1 shows that the evaluating parenting and non-evaluating parenting styles result in identical 
decisions. What is more, because the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium, open-loop Nash equilibrium, 
feedback Nash Equilibrium, and feedback Stackelberg equilibrium all coincide with each other, there 
is no first mover advantage for the parent whether the parent commits to a plan of action at the 
outset of the game or does not commit at all. 
 
Summary and conclusion 
We analysed the significance of parenting style for the accumulation of child human capital over a 
given planning period. Three different parenting styles were defined according to three intra-family 
decision-making mechanisms, namely cooperative parenting, non-evaluating parenting, and evaluating 
parenting. Cooperative parenting means that a joint utility function is maximized, while non-
evaluating parenting means that intra-family decisions are equated with an open-loop Stackelberg 
equilibrium, with the parent as the leader. The evaluating parenting style means that decisions are 
made according to a feedback Stackelberg equilibrium, and that the parent’s actions are contingent on 
time and the accrued stocks of child human capital and financial assets. We showed that the open-
loop Stackelberg equilibrium in the parenting game is time consistent, and an open-loop Nash 
equilibrium, if it exists, is a degenerate feedback Nash equilibrium, and thus subgame perfect, and a 
feedback Stackelberg equilibrium coincides with a feedback Nash equilibrium, for a broader class of 
games than for which we derived closed form solutions. Moreover, we demonstrated that given 
linearity of the human-capital state equation, the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium coincides with the 
open-loop Nash equilibrium thereby implying that there is no advantage to be the first-mover, i.e., 
parent, under open-loop or feedback information structures. Finally, given the specified forms of the 
functions appearing the parent’s and the child’s optimal control problems and the state equation 
governing human capital, we also demonstrated that equilibria for the evaluating parenting style and 
the non-evaluating parenting style are identical. So, it is immaterial for the terminal stocks of child 
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human capital and financial assets, whether a plan is made and committed to at the outset or if the 
parent makes decisions at each point in time contingent on the accrued stocks.  
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 5 
Substituting the variables in the human-capital state equation (16) for the optimal control vector given 
by (19) yields  
 
( ) 1 1 ( )
1 1
( )
2 2
( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )
1 ( ) ( ) .
r T r T
H H A A H H A A
r T
H H A A
H e e
e
 

            
     
   

           
      
 
This differential equation is of the form ( )( ) r TH a be    , where 
  def 11 1 2 21 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ,H H H H H Ha           
            
 
def 1
1 2( ) ( ) ( ).A A A A A Ab        
        
The general solution is 1 ( )( ) r TH a r be c      , where c  is a constant of integration. The initial 
condition 0(0)H H  gives 
1
0
rTc H r be  . Hence 1 ( )0( ) ( )
rT r TH H r b e e a        and 
* 1
0( ) ( 1)
rTH T H r b e aT    . Inserting the expressions for a and b  in *( )H T  and rearranging 
terms gives Eq. (20). 
 
Proof of Proposition 6 
Substituting the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium values given by (25) in the human-capital state 
equation (16) yields  
 ( ) 1 1 ( ) ( )1 1 2 2( ) 1 1 1 .
r T r T r T
H A H A H AH e e e
                                  
Proceeding analogously to the proof of Proposition 2 gives Eq. (26). 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 8 
Assuming an interior solution, the necessary and sufficient conditions for a maximum of the right-
hand sides of the HJB equations (28) and (29) are 
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 1 0p pH AI V V    , 
 1 0pAQ V   , 
  1 11 0
c c
H AQ V V     , 
 2 21 0
c c
H AQ V V    .  
 
Next, solve for the four control variables from the preceding optimality conditions, substitute them in 
each HJB equation, and then substitute the partial derivatives of the conjectured value functions in 
Eqs. (30) and (31) in the HJB equations to arrive at the form of the HJB equations used to find the six 
coefficients in Eqs. (30) and (31). For the parent, the HJB equation becomes 
 
   1 2
2 2 1 11
2 12
1 1 2 2
2 1 1 2
( ) ( ) ( )
4 ( ) 1 1 ( ) ( ) ( )
  ( )  ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
a H b A c
y b a a b
rb A b a e b b d
a e a d
  
     
          
         
 
 
  
      
 
 
             
 
           
 
where  
   ( ) ( )1 2
2 2 ( ) 2 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( )1
2 12
1 ( ) 1 2 2
2 1 1 2
4 1 1
1( )
r T r T
A H H A
r T r T r T r T
A H A A H A
r T
H A H H
y e e
e e e ec
e
 
   

     
         
         
 
     
  
      
 
 
              
 
           
 
 
and for the child the HJB equation is 
     1 1 22
1 1 21
2 1 2
( ) ( ) ( )
1 4 ( ) 1 ( )
  ( )  ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) ( ) ,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
d H e A f
y e d
re A d e e e b
a e d b d e
  
    
         
     
 
   
      
  
            
 
    
 
where  
     ( )1 1 22
1 ( ) 1 2 ( ) ( ) ( )1
2 1 2
( ) ( )
1 4 1
( ) 1 2
r T
A H
r T r T r T r T
H A A A A
r T r T
H A H A H H
y e
f e e e e
e e

   
 
    
         
     

     
 
      
  
            
 
    
 
In order for the conjectured value functions to satisfy the corresponding HJB equations for all 
( , , )A H , the coefficients on ( , ,1)A H  must be identical on each side of both HJB equations. 
Identifying the coefficients on the right- and left-hand sides of each HJB equation gives a system of 
six ordinary differential equations, which can be readily inferred from the preceding two equations, 
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and which can be solved using the boundary conditions ( , ( ), ( )) ( ) ( )p A HV T A T H T A T a H T   
and ( , ( ), ( )) ( ) ( )c A HV T A T H T A T H T   .  
 
